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AD.MIRAILTY-JURISDICTIoN-INJURY TO POWuR Cr, L.-The plaintiff, an
electric power corporation, conducted its electricity by means of cables rest-
ing on the floor of a bay. The defendant's steamship negligently damaged
the plaintiff's power cables by dragging its anchor against them. Plain-
tiff instituted a libel in personam in admiralty for injury to its property.
The district court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that
the libel should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Nippon Ywscn Kabushiki Kaisha v. Great Wcstcrn Power Co., 17 Fed. (2d)
239 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
The test of jurisdiction in admiralty for tort is the locality of the tort.
The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (1865). The cause of action must be complete
on navigable waters. Ex parte Phcnix Ins. Co., 118 U. S. 610, 7 Sup. Ct.
25 (1886). By statute, English admiralty courts have jurisdiction over
any claim for damage done by any ship. (1861) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 10, § 7.
But American admiralty courts hold otherwise with respect to claims arising
out of damages inflicted by vessels to structures connected with the shore.
The Panoil, 266 U. S. 433, 45 Sup. Ct. 164 (1925) (injury to dyke by steam-
ship); The Plymouth, supra (fire spreading from ship to adjacent ware-
house); Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elerator Co., 119 U. S. 38, 7 Sup.
Ct. 254 (1886) (building on land injured by jib of passing vessel); Clcve-
land T. & V. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316, 28 Sup. Ct. 414
(1908) (damage by ships to dock, bridge, protection piling and pier). But
jurisdiction exists to entertain claims for penalties and damages arising
out of violations of federal statutes relating to rivers and harbors. The
Scow "6-S," 250 U. S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 452 (1919); The 0. L. Halcnbech,
260 Fed. 554 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) (libels by United States government for
illegal dumping in harbor); The Gansfjord, 1927 Am. Mar. Cas. 513 (E. D.
La. 1927) (libel for negligent damage to United States jetty wall). And
for injuries to property lying entirely within the bounds of navigable
waters providing that (1) the land connection is purely "technical," and
(2) its sole purpose is to aid navigation. The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361,
25 Sup. Ct. 46 (1904) (injury to government beacon); The Raithw n e, 241
U. S. 166, 36 Sup. Ct. 514 (1916) (injury to uncompleted beacon and scaf-
folding). Doullut & Williams Co. v. United States, 208 U. S. 33, 45 Sup.
Ct. 411 (1925) (damage to piling in river used solely for mooring ships).
Courts have not taken jurisdiction, however, for claims arising out of in-
jury to "extensions of the shore." The Panoil, s upra (injury to dyhre
whose sole purpose was to change river currents in aid of navigation).
But jurisdiction exists for claims arising out of injuries to vessels by land
structures, Dorrington v. Detroit, 223 Fed. 232 (C. C. -A. th, 1915);
Greenwood v. Westport, 53 Fed. 824 (D. Conn. 1893) (vessels injured by
negligent operation of bridges); cf. Stevens v. Westcrn Union Tel. Co.,
Fed. Cas. No. 13,371 (E. D. N. Y. 1876) (propeller damaged by negli-
gently located telegraph cable). Admiralty has no jurisdiction, however,
over claims arising out of injury to a platform and boring pipes located
in a river. The Poughkeepsie, 162 Fed. 494 (S. D. N. Y. 1903), aff'd with-
out opinion, 212 U. S. 558, 29 Sup. Ct. 687 (1908); cf. The R. J. Moran,
unreported, cited in 162 Fed. 494, 496. It has been held that injury to
telegraph cables is within admiralty jurisdiction. United States v. North
German Lloyd, 239 Fed. 587 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); The Toledo, 242 Fed. 163
(D. N. J. 1917); Postal Telegraph Co. v. Ross, 221 Fed. 105 (E. D. N. Y.
1915). The instant court suggested a distinction between electric power
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cables and telegraph cables on the ground that the latter may be used as
aids to navigation in directing the course and movements of vessels. It is
difficult to see the validity of this distinction. Heretofore the Supreme
Court has restricted to crystallized fact-situations the application of the
"aid to navigation" test. Cf. The Blackheath, supra; The Raithmorc,
supra; Doullut & Williams Co. v. United States, supra. The instant case
seems'to be in harmony with the Supreme Court ruling in the Poughkeepsie
case, supra. Query as to the telegraph cable cases.
ARBITRATION-FEDERAL ACT-ARBITRATION TO TAKE PLACE ABROAD.-
The respondent shipowner and the libellant, owner of the cargo, both Amer-
ican corporations, had agreed in England, that in case of dispute, they
would arbitrate in London under the English Arbitration Act. The libel-
lant brought suit disregarding the agreement and the respondent moved
to stay the action relying on the United States Arbitration Act, which
provides in effect that an action brought in violation of an arbitration
clause shall upon application of the defendant be stayed pending arbitra-
tion. 43 Stat. 883 (1925), U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1925) § 1251 4/5-3.
Held, that the motion to stay proceedings be denied since by the
Arbitration Act agreements will be specifically enforced, only when "the
hearing . . . under such agreement shall be within the district in which
the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed." 43 Stat. 883
(1925), U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1925) § 1251 4/5-4. Silverbook, 1927
Am. Mar. Cas. 584 (E. D. La. 1927).
In New York and in England the courts have stayed actions brought
where there was an agreement to aibitrate in, or to submit to the courts
of, a foreign jurisdiction. Matter of Inter-Ocean Food Products, Inc., 120
Misc. 840, 200 N. Y. Supp. 775 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (agreement to arbitrate in
California),; Kelvin Engineering Go., Inc. v. Blanco, 125 Misc. 728, 210
N. Y. Supp. 10 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (to submit to Cuban courts); Austrian
Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham Life Assurance Society [1903] 1 I. B.
249 (English company agreed in its policy to submit to courts of Buda-
pest)-; Cap Blanco Case [1913] 1 P. 130 (to submit to courts of Hamburg
under German laws). Cf. Sudbury v. Ambi Verwaltung Kommanditgesell-
schaft Auf Aktien, 213 App. Div. 98, 210 N. Y. Supp. 164 (1st Dept. 1925);
(1926) 35 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 503. The various state arbitration acts,
contain provisions for the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements
similar to that of the Federal Act. See (1927) 36 YAME LAW JOURNAL, 866,
867. Such enforcement, as suggested by the instant court, has been limited
to cases where the place of einforcement is within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. Matter of California Packing Corp., 121 Misc. 212, 201 X. Y.
Supp. 158 (Sup. Ct. 1923). It is submitted, nevertheless, that agreements to
arbitrate outside the jurisdiction should be likewise enforced. (1924) 24
COL. L. REV. 204. In the instant case, specific enforcement of the agree-
ment was not sought, there being only a motion to stay the proceedings, and
the court appears to have been misled in basing its decision on its as-
sumed inability to direct arbitration. Apparently the cases in point, cited
supra, were disregarded.
BANKRUPTCY-CONTINGENT CONTRACT RIGHT AS A PROVABLE CLAIM.D-
The defendant sold shares to the plaintiff agreeing to repurchase them
within a stipulated period at the same price upon the plaintiff's written
election to sell. The defendant filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and
was discharged before the plaintiff, who had had notice of the proceedings,
had exercised his option. The plaintiff thereafter brought suit for damages
upon the defendant's refusal to repurchase in accordance with the contract.
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Held, that since the plaintiff's claim was not provable under section 03 of
the Bankruptcy Act [30 Stat. 562 (1898), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §
9647] the defendant was not released by his discharge from bankruptcy.
Perry v. Sturdevant, 218 N. Y. Supp. 678 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provides, with certain express excep-
tions, that the discharge of the bankrupt effects a release of his provable debts.
32 Stat. 798 (1903), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9601. Various fact tran-
sactions present the question whether one party has a provable claim against
another party. This is determined by applying section 63 which enumerates
by generic phrases the types of provable claims. In Central Trust Co. v. Cid-
cago Auditorium Co., 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412 (1916) the Supreme
Court held that a promisee on an executory contract, continued performance
of which would necessitate invested capital, had a provable claim against the
estate of the bankrupt promisor. This was explained on the ground that the
intervening bankruptcy, even though on involuntary proceedings, is an antic-
ipatory breach. In Williams v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 549, 35 Sup. Ct.
289 (1915) it had been held that a surety, who had not paid, had a provable
claim against the bankrupt principal, although it would appear that he had
at most only a right of exoneration. See also In re Gcrson, 107 Fed. 897
(C. C. A. 3d, 1901); In re Lyons Beet Sugar Refining Co., 192 Fed. 446
(W. D. N. Y. 1911). These cases would seem clearly to indicate the pur-
pose of the Supreme Court to recognize as provable, contract claims if they
are susceptible of liquidation. It was indicated in the Auditorium case,
unfortunately, that the question as to leases of land was an open one, and
recently future accruing rent has been again held not a provable claim.
Wells v. Twenty-First Street Realty Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 6th,
1926) rev'g 5 Fed. (2) 106 (D. Ohio, 1925); but cf. In re Mullings Cloth-
ing Co., 238 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916), (1927) 36 YALE LW JOURNL, 418.
A case involving a fact situation quite similar to that in the instant case
was decided on the ground that the creditor, even if the claim were prov-
able, had an option to wait and sue when the right accrued. Pheni.. Nat'l
Bank v. Waterbury, 197 N. Y. 161, 90 N. E. 435 (1910). No peculiar facts,
however, appear in this or the instant case that would seem to take it out
of the doctrine of the Auditorium case. See Rosenheim, Adjudication of
Bankruptcy as Breach of an Executory Contract (1917) 12 BENCH & BAR
(N. S.) 252; (1916) 1 So. L. Q. 349. The court determined that the claim
was not provable because in its opinion it would not be possible to assess
damages at the time of the bankruptcy. The damages from the loss of a
conditional right that the bankrupt buy a commodity in the future would,
however, seem as susceptible of determination as those accruing from the
loss of a right to have services performed or a certain commodity delivered
in the future. Claims similar to that in the instant case have been proved.
In re Neff,-157 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907).
CERTIORARI-STATUTORY LImIrrATioN'S ON USE STRICTLY .APPLiEO.-The
plaintiff sued out a writ of certiorari to review the ruling of the district
court (in an action still pending) directing an answer to the written in-
terrogatories of the defendant presented in accordance with the provisions
of the Iowa Comp. Code (1924) §§ 11185-11192. The petition alleged the
irrelevancy of the questions, and the irreparable injury that would follow
from compliance. Held, (three judges dissenting) that the writ be dis-
missed. Winneskiek County Bank v. District Court, 212 N. W. 391 (Iowa,
1927).
The writ of certiorari, both at common law and, in general, under modern
codes, issues to review only cases where a lower tribunal has acted with-
out jurisdiction or illegally, and where there is no other remedy. Wood-
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ward Iron Co. v. Bradford, 206 Ala. 447, 90 So. 803 (1921); Davison V.
Court, 42 S. D. 254, 173 N. W. 737 (1919) ; Miller v. Wiseman, 125 Me. 4,
130 Ati. 504 (1925); SPELLING, EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES (2d ed. 1901)
1630 et seq; (1890) 10 L. R. A. 248, note. The instant statute is of this
type. Iowa Comp. Code (1924) § 12456; Barry v. Court, 167 Iowa, 306,
149 N. W. 449 (1914). A number of states have effected a change in
name only, substituting for certiorari the writ of review. Garin v. Cham-
bers, 195 Calif. 212, 232 Pac. 696 (1924); MacFarlane v. Burton, 64 Utah,
41, 228 Pac. 193 (1924); Hay v. Hay, 40 Idaho, 159, 232 Pac. 895 (1924).
A comparatively few states have extended the scope of the writ for certain
purposes making it concurrent with an appeal or a writ of error: (1) to
review errors of law, Coolidge v. Bruce, 144 N. E. 397 (Mass. 1924); (2)
to review errors of fact, Tolbert v. Kellis, 34 Ga. App. 49, 128 S. E. 204
(1925); (3) as a direct method of appeal from judgments of quasi-judicial
bodies, Essex County v. Civil Service Commission, 98 N. J. L. 671, 121 Atl.
695 (1923); People v. Sayer, 205 App. Div. 562, 200 N. Y. Supp. 134 (2d
Dept. 1923); (4), as a means of harmonizing opinions of lower courts
with prior decisions of the Supreme Court, State v. Allen, 303 Mo. 608,
267 S. W. 832 (1924). But, whereas the common law writ of certiorari
was appropriate to remove a case only before judgment, it is now the gen-
eral practice to reffise the writ to review an interlocutory order or judg-
ment. See Witmer v. Dist. Court, 155 Iowa, 244, 252, 136 N. W. 113, 116
(1912). SPELLING, oP. cit. supra, at 1635. In the instant case, the juris-
diction of the court was not questioned. Since the order in question was
interlocutory, no direct appeal would lie. (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
905. The plaintiff might have had the order reviewed, however, by com-
plying with the order and appealing from the final judgment. See Witmer
v. Dist. Court, supra at 248, 252, 136 N. W. at 115, 116. Likewise, by re-
fusing to comply thereby, subjecting his petition to dismissal or him-
self, possibly, to citation for contempt. See Finn v. Winneshick Dist.
Court, 145 Iowa, 157, 167, 123 N. W. 1066, 1069 (1909). The ruling ob-
jected to concerned the admissibility of evidence, a matter largely within
the discretion of the trial court. Perry v. Heighton, 26 Iowa, 451 (1868) ;
School District v. School District, 148 Iowa, 154, 125 N. W. 184 (1910).
The irreparable injury alleged is only that incident to a great deal of evi-
dence ordinarily admitted over objection. The convenience, generally, of
leaving such matters to the discretion of the trial court outweighs the in-
creased hardship upon the plaintiff in the particular case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-STATUTES-OPERATION OF STATE STATUTES WHEN
CONSTITUTIONAL BAR IS REmovED.-In accordance with Congressional au-
thority [15 Stat. 34 (1868), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9784, U. S. Code,
§ 548 a Missouri statute provided for an ad valorem tax on national
bank shares. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 12775. Thereafter, in 1917,
a Missouri income tax law was passed making no exemption for dividends
from national banks. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 13106-36. In 1923, the
federal statute was amended to authorize the states to tax the income,
shares, or dividends of national banks, the imposition of any one of these
taxes to be in lieu of the others. 42 Stat. 1499 (1923), U. S. Comp. Stat.
(Supp. 1923) § 9784, U. S. Code, § 548. The plaintiff bank sought to enjoin
the collection of the ad valorem tax as of June 1, 1923. The lower court
granted an injunction, holding that the Missouri income tax law, though
originally invalid as to income derived from dividends of national banks,
was validated by the Congressional Act of 1923 and that as the Missouri
statutes subsequent to that date provided for taxes on both shares and
dividends, only one of which had been authorized by Congress, neither
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could be enforced. On appeal, held, that the judgment be reversed and the
injunction dissolved on the ground that since either tax was authorized,
the tax on the shares of the bank, having been the one first levied, should
continue in lieu of the income tax until such time as the legislature made
a choice. Buder v. First Nat'l Bank, 16 Fed. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927).
Governmental powers have been divided into three groups: (1) thoSe
which may be exercised concurrently by state and federal governments
even in the absence of federal legislation. Willson v. Blackbird Creek Co.,
2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829) ; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S.
1851); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187, 32 Sup. Ct. 626
(1912). (2) Those in which the failure of Congress to act raises an im-
plication against the power of the state to exercise a concurrent authority
unless Congress affirmatively removes the inhibition. In re Da on, 70 111e.
153 (1879) (repeal of Federal Bankruptcy Act revived state insolvency stat-
utes); Butler v. Goreley, 146 U. S. 03, 13 Sup. Ct. 34 (1892) (same);
Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865 (1891) (state law regu-
lating sale of liquors became valid as to imported liquors without re-enact-
ment after Congress removed from imported liquor the protection of the
interstate commerce clause); West Virginia v. Adams Exi'press Co., 219
Fed. 794 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915) (same); see Silz 'v. Hesterbcrg, 211 U. S. 31,
44, 29 Sup. Ct. 10, 14 (1908) (game laws); Nc., York Central R. R. v. Pub-
lie Service Conmmission of N. Y., 263 Fed. 558 (N. D. N. Y. 1920) (state
regulation of railroad rates); Lion bcrger v. Rowse, 43 Mlo. 67 (1368) (local
tax laws) ; Central Pacific R. R. v. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512, 16 Sup. Ct. 885
(1895) (same). Contra: Central Nat'L Bank v. Sutherland, 202 N. W. 423
(Neb. 1925) (same). The court in the instant case properly refused to
apply this doctrine in such a manner as to derogate from the efid sought
by the amendatory legislation. (1926) 39 HEvnv. L. REV. 769. (3) Thoze
in which the nature of the power, like that to legislate for the District
of Columbia, is absolutely and totally repugnant to the exercise of a
similar power by the states, so that an attempt by Congress to delegate
such power will be held unconstitutional. Knickcrbocker Ice Co. v. Stcwart,
253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (1920). Query, how far the federal gov-
ernment can go in removing inhibitions from state legislation on matters
which are considered, either expressly or impliedly, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal government. Cf. Kkickcrbocl:cr Ice Co. v. Ste-
wart, supra; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 1'l1 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. "/57
(1898); (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 373; THomSON, FrDnER CNTruIz7.txIo.'Z
(1923) 123, 167.
CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW-VALIDrrY OF "BAUBES LAW" IIEQUIRLNG LuF Im-
PRISONMIENT ON FOURTH CoxviCTIOx OF FELONY.-The defendants, who had
been previously convicted six times, pleaded guilty to the charge of at-
tempted burglary, and were sentenced under a statute [N. Y. Ann. Cons.
Laws (Supp. 1926) c. 41, §§ 1942-3] requiring life imprisonment on a
fourth conviction of felony, and providing that the previous convictions
need not be alleged in the indictment, but could be shown after convic-
tion. An appeal was taken, inter alia, on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional. Held, that the sentence be affirmed. People v. Gowacky,
244 N. Y. 451, 155 N. E. '737 (1927).
Statutes which impose enhanced penalties on habitual offenders are of
long standing and have been uniformly upheld. See Graham -,. West Vir-
ginia, 224 U. S. 616, 623, 32 Sup. Ct. 583, 535 (1912); (1914) 48 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 204, note. They do not subject the defendant to double jeopardy.
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 21 Sup. Ct. 3S9 (1901); State
v. Findling, 123 Alinn. 413, 144 N. W. 142 (1913). The prior convictions
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are merely regarded as historical facts aggravating the last offense. See
Hyser v. Commonwealth, 116 Ky. 410, 417, 76 S. W. 174, 176 (1903). For
the same reason such statutes are not regarded as being ex post facto,
though enacted after the prior convictions considered. Jones v. State, 9
Okla. Cr. 646, 133 Pac. 249 (1913). And since the legislature has great
latitude in determining the severity of punishment, they are not objec-
tional as imposing cruel or unusual punishments. State v. Dowden, 137
Iowa, 573, 115 N. W. 211 (1908); cf. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky.
748, 265 S. W. 339 (1924) (death sentence for burglary). Similarly, they
cannot be attacked on the ground that they leave no discretion in the trial
judge. See State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 169, 103 Pac. 27, 28 (1909).
The instant statute is not unique in its severity. Or. Laws (1921) c. 70;
Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) § 2286; W. Va. Code Ann. (Barnes,
1923) c. 152, § 24 (requiring life sentence on third conviction of felony).
Since a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his identity
with the accused in the previous convictions, it has been held that, in the
absence of statute, they must be alleged in the indictment and proved on
the trial. People v. Sickles, 156 N. Y. 541, 51 N. E. 288 (1898). Contra:
State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 Atl. 452 (1921). But the same court
admitted, and it has been held, that the investigation may be deferred by
statute until after a verdict of guilty on the principal issue. See People V,
Rosen, 208 N. Y. 169, 173, 101 N. E. 855, 857 (1913); Graham v. West
Virginia, supra. The latter procedure, authorized by the instant statute,
seems highly desirable, since it prevents the jury from on the one hand
convicting because of past crimes, or on the other, acquitting because of
the severity of the punishment. (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 440.
CRIMINAL LAw-OWNER'S "INTENT" TO PASS "TITLE" PRECLUDES CON-
VICTION FOR LARCENY.-The defendant, whose lease had expired, by telling
A that the lease had two years to run, induced him to take a sub-lease
for one month and to pay the rent one week in advance of taking pos-
session. A never acquired possession of the premises. The defendant was
indicted for (1) obtaining money under false pretenses, and (2) larceny.
The trial court dismissed the first count because under the Rent Law the
defendant had the privilege of retaining possession by paying the rent to
his landlord, but the defendant was convicted of larceny. Held, on appeal,
(two judges dissenting) that the conviction be quashed since there was no
evidence to justify the jury's finding that A had intent to pass possession
only. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927).
One of the essential elements of common law larceny was a "trespassory"
taking. BRACTON, 3 De Corona C. 32 Fol. 160 (b); CoKE, 3 Inst. 107;
HAWKiNS P. C. (6th ed. 1788) 134; Ravens Case, Kel. J. 24 (K. B. 1662).
Common law cheating was indictable only if accomplished by means of a
"token" of a public nature calculated to deceive common prudence. Reg. v.
Jones, 1 Salk. 379 (K. B. 1702); Wheatly's Case, 2 Burr. 1125 (K. B.
1761) ; 2 East P. C. (1803) 816. Thereafter, the scope of the latter cate-
gory was enlarged by legislation. (1541) 33 Hen. VIII. c. 1 (cheating by
means of private tokens prohibited) ; (1757) 30 Geo. II, c. 24, § 1 (obtain-
ing property by false pretenses made misdemeanor); Young v. King, 3
Term R. 98 (K. B. 1789) (applying latter statute). Subsequently, the
courts developed the doctrine of "larceny by trick." Rex v. Pear, 2 East
P. C. 685 (K. B. 1779); Rex v. Patch, 1 Leach C. C. *273 (K. B. 1782).
This, in effect, eliminated the requisite of a "trespassory" taking where the
owner "intended" to deliver merely "possession" as distinguished from
"title" and the recipient thereafter appropriated the chattel to his own
use. But where the owner "intended" to pass "title" the defendant could
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be held only for "false pretenses." 2 East P. C. (1803) 816; (1021) 30
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 613. The fact-situations were sometimes very similar.
Rex v. Patch, supra (larceny-A induced B to give him money as security
for safekeeping by B of worthless chattel) ; Reg. v. Wilson, 8 Car. & P. 111
(1837) (no larceny-A induced B to give him money for a worthless chat-
tel). A New York statute provides that "a person who, with intent to
deprive the true owner of his property . . . obtains from such [owner]
possession by color . . . of false pretenses . . . steals such prop-
erty and is guilty of larceny." N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (2d ed. 1913) c. 41,
§ 1290. This statute was apparently aimed at the abolition of the distinc-
tion. But the New York court held that the owner's "intent" to pass
"title" would still preclude a conviction for larceny. People v. Demar, 100
N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887); ef. People T. Cory, 124 Misc. 532, 203
N. Y. Supp. 768 (King's Co. Ct. 1925). To base such variant results on a
supposed distinction as to the owners "intent" would seem to be undesirable
in view of the defendant's undoubted culpability in both situations. To at-
tempt to ascertain whether an owner "intends" to pass "possession" rather
than "title" is to assume the doubtful proposition that he himself contem-
plates such metaphysical distinctions.
CRIMmrAL LAW-PLEA or FomER JEOPiMMY-IORE THAN ONE PF0SO:4
INJURED BY SA.sm AcT.-The defendant was acquitted of the manslaughter
of A, alleged to have been caused by his negligent operation of an auto-
mobile. Thereafter he was indicted for assault and battery of B alleged
to have been caused by the identical act. The defendant pleaded prior
acquittal to the latter indictment but the plea was dismissed. Held, on
appeal, that the plea should have been allowed since both alleged crimes
were the product of the same act. State v. Cosgrove, 135 At. S71 (N. J.
1927).
The New Jersey constitution provides that "no person shall, after ac-
quittal, be tried for the same offense." N. J. Const. art. 1, par. 10. The
problem involved would seem to be centered about the meaning of the
word "offense" within the meaning of this clause. Most courts have held,
in accordance with the instant decision, that when a single act causes in-
juries to more than one person, only one offense is commited. State v.
Cooper, 96 N. J. L. 376, 115 Atl. 386 (1921) (acquittal for manslaughter
barred indictment for assault and battery); Rufji7, v. State, 29 Ga. App.
214, 114 S. E. 581 (1922) (acquittal of homicide of A barred prosecution
for homicide of B); Commonwealth v. Veley, 63 Pa. Super. Ct. 439 (1916)
(where three people were killed by the breaking of a dam, the acquittal
of the owner for the manslaughter of one barred subsequent prosecution
for another); see Ave-a v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. App. 155, 253 S. W. 521
(1923). The courts which hold otherwise reason that each consequence is
a distinct crime because proof of facts alleged in one indictment would not
have supported a conviction under the other. People v. Brannon, 70 Calif.
App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924); Commonwealth v. Browning, 140 Ky. 770,
143 S. W. 407 (1912); see State v. Corbitt 117 S. C. 350, 358, 109 S. E.
133, 135 (1921). The principal significance of the consequence of any
given act is in determining whether such conduct will be punished and,
if so, the amount of punishment to be assessed. No significance should be
attached to the consequence in determining whether a second prosecution
should be permitted with respect to a given act. It might be argued that
the jury would convict him under the second indictment where it would
refuse to under the first, because of the less severe nature of the punish-
ment to follow. The answer would seem to be that the defendant could
have been indicted for both consequences at the same time and thus could
have been tried for them simultaneously.
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INSURANCE-BREACH OF WARRANTY-ESToPPEL AVAILABLE ONLY TO IN-
NOCENT INSURM.-The defendant issued a burglary insurance policy to
the plaintiff, both parties knowing that certain statements therein war-
ranted to be true were in fact false. The plaintiff claimed that the de-
fendant was estopped to set up a defense of breach of warranty. The City
Court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Held,
on appeal, that the judgment of the City Court be affirmed. Satz v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 243 N. Y. 385, 153 N. E. 844 (1926).
With the exception of the federal courts and the courts of Massachusetts
and New Jersey, it is generally, if somewhat uncertainly, held that an in-
surer is estopped, as against an insured accepting the policy in good faith
without actual knowledge of its invalidity, to set up a breach of warranty
known to it or its agent at the inception of the contract. Grand View
Bld'g Ass'nv. Northern Assurance Co., 73 Neb. 149, 102 N. W. 246 (1905);
People's Fire Ins. Ass'n of Arkansas v. Goyne, 79 Ark. 315, 96 S. W. 365
(1906); Andrus v. Maryland Cas. Co., 91 Minn. 358, 98 N. W. 200 (1904).
And this rule applies even when the insured by reading the policy might
have learned of the broken warranty, if in fact he did not read it. N. W.
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 24 Ariz. 86, 206 Pac. 1081 (1922); Busboom
v. Cap. Fire Ins. Co., 111 Neb. 855, 197 N. W. 957 (1924). The minority
view may be explained by the failure of those courts which adhere to it
to distinguish carefully, if at all, between the equitable doctrine of estoppel
and the contract principle of waiver. This results in applying the parol
evidence rule where it has no application. Estoppel may be shown by parol
but not always waiver. Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Btd'g
Ass'n, 183 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. 133 (1902) which practically overruled
Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222 (U. S. 1871); Frank-
lin Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin, 40 N. J. L. 568 (1878); Harris v. No. Amer.
Ins. Co., 190 Mass. 361, 77 N. E. 493 (1906). See Vance, Waiver and
Estoppel in Insurance Law (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 834; (1922)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 778; (1921) 5 MINN. L. REv. 136. But estoppel,
while provable in an action at law, is essentially equitable in nature and
most courts hold that actual knowledge by the insured at the time of the
inception of the policy that it is inoperative because of a breach of condi-
tion will defeat his claim of estoppel. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117
U. S. 519, 6 Sup. Ct. 837 (1887); Haapa v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 150 Mich.
467, 114 N. W. 380 (1907); Priest v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 116 Kan
421, 227 Pac. 538 (1924); (1925) 23 MICH. L. Rsv. 304. Contra: Sun Life
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 70 S. W. 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902); Guardian Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35 (1875); Huestess v. So. Atl. Life Ins. Co.,
88 S. C. 31, 70 S. E. 403 (1911). In any case, it would seem desirable to
allow the insured to recover all premiums paid.
INSURANCE--TORTS-MISTAxE IN APPLICATION.-In an application by a
husband and wife for a joint life policy, the medical examiner of the de-
fendant company correctly put down the husband's answers, but erron-
eously recorded an answer of the plaintiff. Both applicants, unaware of the
mistake, signed the document without reading it. The error caused the
plaintiff to appear a doubtful risk and the policy was withheld pending in-
vestigation. In the interim the husband died. In an action for damages
for the negligent delay in acting upon the application, the lower court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed.
Evans v. Int. Life Ins. Co., 252 Pac. 266 (Kan. 1927).
The negligent delay of an agent in forwarding an application will sup-
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port an action in tort against the insurance company in most jurisdictions.
Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925) ;
Fox v. Volunteer Life Ins. Co., 135 N. C. 121, 116 S. E. 266 (1923) ; (1924)
34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 102. Contra: Interstate Bztsiness Men's Ass'n v.
Nichols, 143 Ark. 369, 220 S. W. 477 (1920). Where the negligent mistake
of its agent in filling out an application causes a similar delay, it would
seem reasonable likewise to hold the insurer responsible. See Meyer v.
Central States Life Ins. Co., 103 Neb. 640, 641, 173 N. W. 578, 579 (1919).
Although the operative facts constitute only an offer, the results suggested
finds support in the tendency to regard insurers as having in some meas-
ure the status of public service corporations. (1926) 20 COL. L. REv. 203,
207; (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 673. In the instant case it would seem
clear that the insurer should be responsible in damages resulting from
such delay unless the applicant's failure to detect the error be regarded as
negligence. It is generally held that a person is charged with knowledge of
the contents of any writing signed by him. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)
§§ 35, 90a. There is developing, however, a tendency to except insur-
ance cdntracts from the operation of this rule. Williams v. Pacific States
Fire Ins. Co., 251 Pac. 258 (Or. 1926) ; 3 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON THE IAW OF
INSURANCE (1905) 2572, 2573; (1924) 24 COL. L. RBu. 95. Contra: South-
erm Surety Co. v. Benton, 280 S. W. 551 (Tex. 1920); Layton v. Ncz
York Life Ins. Co., 55 Calif. App. 202, 202 Pac. 958 (1921); (1924) 22
lICH. L. REv. 274. Accordingly, knowledge of a mistake in the application
or a variance in the policy is not imputed to the insured from the fact of
possession of the policy with the application attached. Schmidtt v. Masza-
chusetts Protective Ass'n, Inc., 212 N. W. 5 (Blinn. 1927); Vance, Waiver
and Estoppel in Insurance Law (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNL, 859, n. 98.
It would seem desirable to protect the insured in his expectation that the
insurer's examiner will perform his duties accurately. Cf. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of New York v. Brown, 34 Ga. App. 301, 129 S. E. 307 (1925).
INSURANCE-ToTAL DISABIITY CLAusE-FAiLun E TO NoTIFy INSURER Ex-
cusED.-The plaintiff was the beneficiary of her husband's life insurance
policy with the defendant company. The policy contained a total disability
clause excusing payment of premiums but requiring notice before default.
An additional premium was charged for said clause. The insured became
insane and defaulted. Subsequently he died. The plaintiff thereupon
notified the company of these facts and demanded the proceeds. The de-
fendant refused to pay because of the omission to notify as required by the
policy. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal,
(one judge dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed because the require-
ment of notice was excused by the insured's inability to give it. Leran v,.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 136 S. E. 304 (S. C. 1927).
In the absence of a provision in the policy to the contrary, total dis-
ability will not excuse the payment of the premium. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. i-.
Alexander, 122 Mliss. 813, 85 So. 93 (1920); Rocci v. Mass. Ace. Co., 222
Mass. 336, 110 N. E. 972 (1916). But it is otherwise when total disability
is relied on only to excuse failure to give notice. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Carroll, 209 Ky. 522, 273 S. W. 54 (1925) ; Reed v. Loyal Protective
Ass'n, 154 Mich. 161, 117 N. W. 600 (1908); Corbin, Supervening Im7possi-
bility of Performing Conditions Precedent (1922) 22 CoL. L. Ruv. 425;
VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 503; 4 COOLEY, BRES ON LAW OF INsUrAzaC;
(1905) § 3462. Some courts reach the same result as the instant case by
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denying that the giving of notice as required is a condition precedent in
that the purpose of such a requirement is to supply the company with evi-
dence and to prevent fraudulent claims, which is as well accomplished by
later notification. Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Hazard, 148 Ky. 465, 146 W.
1107 (1912); State Life Ins. Co. v. Fann, 269 S. W. 1111 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925). Contra: Hanson v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 229 Ill. App. 15
(1923). Other courts declare such acts are "conditions subsequent" and as
a result will not permit non-fulfillment thereof to extinguish "accrued"
rights. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 27 Okla. 496, 112 Pac. 1026
(1910); Watson v. Ocean Ace. & Guarantee Corp., 238 Pac. 338 (Ariz.
1925). Most courts, however, hold that such acts are conditions precedent
but that performance is excused by total disability. Woodman Ace. Ass'n V.
Pratt, 62 Neb. 674, 87 N. W. 546 (1901).; Hayes v. Continental Cas. Co., 98
Mo. App. 410 (1903); of. ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) § 359.
Thus, if the omission to give the requisite notice is due to the fault of the
insured, the provision is enforced. Woodward v. Security Ins. Co. of New
Haven, 201 Iowa, 378, 207 N. W. 351 (1926). It would appear difficult, if
not impossible, to ascertain what the parties "intended" with respect to the
necessity of performing under the circumstances of the instant case. But
where the failure to perform is the result of impossibility, it would seem
fair to excuse non-performance inasmuch as the insurance company has
been paid for its additional obligation and is only slightly, if at all, preju-
diced by the omission to notify. Cf. London Guarantee & Ace. Co. v. Oflicer,
78 Colo. 441, 242 Pac. 989 (1925) (plaintiff not appointed in requisite ca-
pacity until after stipulated period) ; Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Waterford,
145 Ark. 420, 224 S. W. 953 (1920) (the only person knowing of the pro-
vision was killed).
JOINT TENANCIES-RIGHT OF SURVIVORSIP DENIED JOINT DrosITon.
The plaintiff and her deceased husband both worked and contributed their
earnings to a bank account, made payable to either or survivor. The plain-
tiff contended that a joint tenancy was created and that the balance passed
to her by right of survivorship, thus avoiding the necessity of administra-
tive proceedings. The plaintiff excepted to the instructions of the probate
court as to the nature of a joint tenancy. Held, on appeal, that the excep-
tions be overruled because some of the four unities essential to a joint
tenancy were lacking, and in addition joint tenancies are disfavored. Ap-
peal of Garland, 136 Atl. 459 (Me. 1927); cf. Portland Nat'l Bank v.
Brooks, 136 At. 458 (Me. 1927).
At common law a conveyance to husband and wife, unless explicitly
limited, created an estate by entireties. Kung v. Kurtz, 8 Del. Ch. 404, 68
Atl. 450 (1899) ; Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 927, note. A tenancy by entireties is
essentially a joint tenancy modified by the conception of the unity of hus-
band and wife. Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219, 4 N. E. 824 (1886).
Since the Married Women's Property Acts, tenancies by entireties are not
recognized in many states. Appeal of Robinson, 88 Me. 17, 33 At]. 652
(1895) ; (1895) 30 L. R. A. 314, note. In the instant case, the court ap-
plied as the test of a joint tenancy the presence of the four unities of time,
title, interest and possession, according to Blackstone's analysis. 2 BL.
CoMm. *180-184. But, the unity of time has not always been indispens-
able. Brent's Case, 3 Dyer 340 (1575), (estate to A, and to such wife as
he shall afterwards marry). Powell v. Powell, 68 Ky. 619 (1869) (estate
to wife and child, unborn at time of conveyance). TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(2d ed. 1924) 627. The unity of title has been often disregarded or
evaded by fiction. Saxon v. Saxon, 46 Misc. 202, 93 N. Y. Supp. 191
(1905); Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 984 (1889); Hiles v.
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Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337 (1895); Hayes v. Horton, 46 Or.
597, 81 Pac. 386 (1905). Since a man could not convey to his wife at
common law,* a favorite method of complying with the technical require-
ments of a tenancy by entireties or a joint tenancy was by a conveyance
to a third party and a reconveyance to the husband and wife. Flading v.
Rose, 58 BId. 13 (1882); (1916) 82 CENT. L. J. 101. Many courts have
held joint bank accounts joint tenancies by considering the deposit with
the bank analogous to a conveyance to a third party. Dceals Adm'r v.
Merchant's and Mech. Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S. E. 135 (1917) ; Ezein v.
Felter, 283 Ill. 36, 119 N. E. 926 (1918). Although joint tenancies are gen-
erally held in disfavor, they are desirable for particular purposes. Philh.
R. R. v. Lehigh Co., 36 Pa. 204 (1360) (excepting conveyance to trustees
from statute abolishing joint tenancies). Many statutes abolishing joint
tenancies exempt conveyances to joint trustees and mortgages to secure
debts to joint creditors. Mlass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 184, § 7; Ind. Ann. Stat.
(1926) § 13384. The tendency today is in favor of considering joint ban:
accounts joint tenancies, where the intent of the parties to provide for
survivorship is clear. (1926) 20 ILL. L. REV. 503; (1926) 0 YALE LA,"
JOURNAL, 138. It would seem unfortunate that the court confined itself to
more or less mechanistic reasoning, quite overlooking what would appear
to be a desirable social policy.
LuITATIONS OF ACTIONS--An3SENCE FRoM STATE-SERVICE OF PrOC-Ss
AT "USUAL PLACE OF ABODE."--In an action on promissory notes made by the
defendant's intestate, the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. The
intestate was "domiciled" and had a residence in New Yorl. He also
owned, to the plaintiff's knowledge, a farm in Connecticut where his wife
resided eight months each year and where the defendant during this time
regularly spent one full month in adidtion to week-ends. The trial court
gave judgment for the plaintiff relying on the statutory provision that:
"In computing the time limited, . ..the time during which the party ...
shall be without this state, shall be excluded." Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) §
6169. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed because the defend-
ant could have been served with process under the statutory provision that
"service . . . shall be made . . . at his usual place of abode"
[Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § .5591] and therefore was not "without the state"
within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Clegg v. Bl.shop, 105 Conn.
564, 136 Atl. 102 (Conn. 1927).
. If a person can be served with process within the jurisdiction, it would
seem fair to hold that the statute of limitations runs in his favor during
that time. On this hypothesis, the question in the instant case is whether
the defendant had a "usual place of abode" in Connecticut for the purpose
of service of process. The principal object of service of process is to give
the defendant actual notice. See Grant v. Dallber, 11 Conn. 234, 2*7
(1836). Accordingly, it is held that where a person lives temporarily at
a certain place so that he would in fact probably get notice by service, that
is his "usual place of abode." D21nn's Appeal, 35 Conn. 82 (138) (de-
fendant's house had been sold, and service was made at jail where he was
imprisoned). Harrison v. Farrington, "5 N. J. Eq. 4 (1882) (service at
defendant's summer home even though he also had town house with ser-
vants). The requirement of notice has been held to be attained by service
at the summer home of the defendant's family even though defendant was
temporarily absent. Camden Safe-Deposit & Trzfpt Co. v. Barbour, 06 N.
J. L. 103, 48 Atl. 1008 (1901). But the inference that a man's "usual
place of abode" is where his family lives may be rebutted. Berryhill v.
Sepp, 106 Blinn. 458, 119 N. W. 404 (1909) (service at house of defendant's
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wife inoperative when they were living apart); Grant v. Lawrence, 37
Utah, 450, 108 Pac. 931 (1910) (service at home of one wife while de-
fendant, a Mormon, was abroad with another wife, held inoperative). The
later decisions indicate that courts recognize that the likelihood of receiving
notice is the controlling factor. Thus a man may have two "usual places of
abode" and either will suffice for service of process. Donus v. Lyon, 92
Conn. 55, 101 Atl. 490 (1917). Assuming, however, that the intestate in
the instant case, could have been served, yet most courts hold, under similar
statutes of limitations, that absence from the jurisdiction will toll the run-
ning. Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah, 391, 231 Pac. 123 (1924).
Roth v. Holman, 105 Kan. 175, 182 Pac. 416 (1919). But Connecticut has
held otherwise. Sage v. Hawley, 16 Conn. 107 (1844) (statute not tolled
where defendant temporarily left his family on two trips of eight months
each). The latter view would seem to be more desirable in that creditors
are forced to take reasonably prompt action without being prejudiced.
MASTER AND SERVANT-VERDICT AGAINST MASTER AND NOT AGAINST SER-
VANT NOT INCONSISTENT.-The plaintiffs sued a master and his servant to
recover for injuries caused by the latter's negligence in driving an automo-
bile in the course of the master's business. The jury's verdict was against
the master but was silent as to the servant. The master appealed on the
ground that an exoneration of the servant was necessarily, under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior, a finding of no right of action against the
master. Held, that judgment be affirmed since the silence of the verdict
is a mistrial as to the servant, and not a finding of no negligence on his
part. Dunbaden v. Castles Ice Cream Co., 135 Atl. 886 (N. J. 1927).
In an action against both master and servant based on the sole negligence
of the servant, a majority of the courts have upheld a verdict against the
master only where a verdict is likewise returned against the servant.
Begin v. Lieder'bach Bus Co., 167 Minn. 84, 208 N. W. 546 (1926); Low-
ney v. Butte Electric Ry., 61 Mont. 497, 204 Pac. 485 (1921); Southern
By. v. Harbin, 135 Ga. 122, 68 S. E. 1103 (1910). Extended to its logical
extreme, if the plaintiff is under a disability to sue the servant, the master
is relieved of responsibility. Maine v. Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa, 1278,
201 N. W. 20 (1924); but see (1925) 10 IowA L. BULL. 228; (1925) 38
HARV. L. REV. 824. Other courts have held the master responsible in the
following situations: (1) when, as in the instant case, the jury verdict is
silent as to the servant. Whitsell v. Jophin & P. Ry., 115 Kan. 53, 222
Pac. 133 (1924) ; see Feury v. Reid Ice Cream Go., 126 Atl. 462, 463 (N. J.
1924). (2) When there exists a statutory presumption of negligence on
the part of the master, on the theory that the jury may find against the
master'and in favor of the servant to whom the presumption does not apply.
Davis v. Hareford, 156 Ark. 67, 245 S. W. 833 (1922) ; see dissenting opin-
ion in Southern Ry. v. Harbin, supra, at 126, 68 S. E. at 1106. These are
desirable results based on unconvincing reasons and distinctions. Only one
jurisdiction appears to have upheld a verdict against the master when the
servant is expressly exonerated. Weil v. Hagan, 166 Ky. 750, 179 S. W.
835 (1915) ; but see (1916) 16 COL. L. REV. 164. The latter view finds sup-
port by analogy, in the refusal of the courts in criminal cases to upset
jury verdicts 6n the ground of inconsistency. Steckler v. United States, 7
Fed. (2d) 59 JC. C. A. 2d, 1925); Weiderman v. United States, 10 Fed.
(2d) 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). Moreover, the effect of such results is to
place the loss on those in the best position to distribute it among the com-
munity, the desirability of which would appear as great here as in the case
of Workmen's Compensation. See Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23
COL. L. REv. 444, 456, et seq. The majority rule appears to be particularly
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undesirable when the appelate court directs the entering of judgment for
the defendant-appellant and refuses a new trial. (1922) 22 COL. L. REv.
596. Some courts nevertheless do so. Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63
Pac. 572 (1901) ; see Lowney v. Butter Electric Ry., supra, at 505, 204 Pac.
at 487. The upsetting of these so-called inconsistent verdicts is an attempt
to force juries to conform to the courts' own logical processes-a course
which seems neither practical nor desirable.
PERSONS-DIVORCE-SuPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT PnRMIrTT .- After the
action was at issue in a suit for an absolute divorce on grounds of adultery,
the plaintiff was granted leave to serve a supplemental complaint, alleging
acts of adultery, committed by the defendant subsequent to the commence-
ment of the suit. Held, on appeal, that the complaint be allowed under the
Civil Practice Act providing that " . . . the court may . . . per-
mit . . . a supplemental complaint . . . alleging material facts
which occurred after his former pleading or of which he was ignorant
when it was made." N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 245 (1920). Otto V. Otto,
220 N. Y. Supp. 513 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1927).
Upon facts similar to those in the instant case, the New York courts
have consistently refused to permit a supplemental complaint to be iled,
declaring that this introduced a new cause of action. Mincr v. Milner, 2
Edw. Ch. 114 (N. Y. 1833) ; Faas v. Faas, 57 App. Div. 611, 68 N. Y. Supp.
509 (1st Dept. 1901); Beauley v. Bealcey, 199 App. Div. 280, 191 X. Y.
Supp. 398 (1st Dept. 1921). CARMODY, NEw YORK PaMCTICE (1923) § 924.
See (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 1057, 1060. The defendant, however, might al-
lege in a supplemental answer and counterclaim, any acts of misconduct
committed by the plaintiff subsequent to the conunencement of a suit for
absolute divorce. Blanc v. Blanc, 67 Hun, 384, 22 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1st Dept.
1893). And even where the original suit was for separation only. Anz.
v. Ames, 109 Mlisc. 161, 178 N. Y. Supp. 177 (Sup. Ct. 1919). In suits
for separation for cruelty, moreover, the plaintiff has been permitted to
show any acts of cruelty committed by the defendant subsequent to the
suit. Smith v. Smith, 99 App. Div. 283, 90 N. Y. Supp. 927 (1st Dept.
1904). The instant decision is to be commended as a direct step toward
simplicity and efficiency in litigation.
PUBLIC SERVICE--PAYMENT OF JOINT RIATE FOR INTERNATIONAL T&%xs-
PORTATION.-JOint rates between American and Canadian railroads were
established by the railroads in terms of dollars when the exchange value
of the Canadian dollar was equal to that of the American dollar. The
charges were divided on a percentage basis according to a contract between
the railroads. At a time when the Canadian dollar had depreciated the
defendant shipped goods from Canada to Minnesota. The defendant paid
to the American railroad at the destination its percentage of the established
dollar rate in American dollars plus an additional sum (either in Canadian
dollars or their then American equivalent) representing the Canadian rail-
road's percentage. The plaintiff, claiming that the dollar rate should have
been computed entirely in terms of American dollars, sued to recover the
balance. The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on ap-
peal, (one judge dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed since a contrary
holding would tend to disrupt rate structures. Washburn-Crosby Co. v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 16 Fed. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
The rate (computed in American dollars) filed with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission is the only rate that an American carrier can charge
for services rendered in this country. See Abrasive Co. v. Director Gciz-
eral, 69 I. C. C. 630, 633 (1922). Likewise, a Canadian carrier's charge
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for services rendered in Canada is fixed by the rate (computed in Canadian
dollars) filed with the Board of Railway Commissioners of Canada. See
United States Surcharge Case, 27 Can. Ry. Cas. 90, 104 (1921). It would
seem, therefore, that in the instant case the defendant paid all that the
plaintiff and Canadian carriers were entitled to collect as compensation
for their joint services and that payment as required by the court would
create an excess which neither railroad could lawfully keep. If payment
as made by the defendant tends to disrupt rate structures and give the
Canadian carriers an undue increase in business, the plaintiff railroad can
obtain relief from the Interstate Commerce Commission. See dissenting
opinion in the instant case.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAX-Gins MADE IN CONTEMPLATION OF
DEATH.-A transfer of land by gift was made by the decedent, aged 80
years, within two years of her death. At the time of the transfer, although
she was in good health, she expressed the desire to save the donee from
the burden of the inheritance tax. By order of the surrogate court the
gift was taxed under a statute providing that a gratuitous transfer within
two years of death is presumptively in contemplation of death. Held, on
appeal, that the order, be reversed since the showing that there was no
condition of ill health or bad faith rebutted the presumption. In re
Baird's Estate, 219 N. Y. Supp. 158 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1927).
Most states have imposed taxes on gifts made in contemplation of death
in order to prevent avoidance of inheritance taxes. In the construction of
'these statutes, courts have required proof of apprehension of impending
death arising from existing bodily infirmity. People v. Forman, 322 Ill.
223, 153 N. E. 376 (1926); Evans, "Contemplation of Death" in Inheri-
tance Taxation (1926) 24 MICH. L. REv. 461; (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
859. Many states, to overcome the difficulties of such a requirement, have
enacted that gifts made within a certain period before death shall be
deemed to be within the tax. These statutes have no application to bar
proof that gifts made prior to the period specified were not in fact made
in contemplation of death. Succession of Vatter, 150 La. 605, 91 So. 60
(1922). A conclusive statutory presumption, for a six year period, has
been held unconstitutional. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46
Sup. Ct. 260 (1926). As indicated by the minority opinion, the Schlesinger
case left open the question of whether an irrebuttable presumption for a
more limited period would be valid. (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1011.
'A rebuttable presumption is of little value since the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence is easily sustained when the evidence is largely
within the exclusive knowledge of those opposing the tax, especially where,
as in the instant case, "contemplation of death" is narrowly interpreted.
Cf. Estate of Ebeling, 169 Wis. 432, 172 N. W. 734 (1919). A more effec-
tive method of reaching gifts made to avoid the tax is by defining by stat-
ute the phrase "contemplation of death" as "that expectancy of death which
actuates the mind of a person on the execution of his will," and declaring
the purpose of the law to be "to tax any and all transfers which are made
in lieu of or to avoid the passing of property transferred by testate and
intestate laws." Calif. Laws 1921, c. 821, § 2 (1-4); cf. similar statutes
in Colorado, Ohio and Tennessee. This definition has been interpreted
as not requiring proof of either the apprehension of impending death or
existing physical infirmity. In 'e Pauson's Estate, 186 Calif. 358, 199 Pae.
331 (1921); Chambers v. Larronde, 196 Calif. 100, 235 Pac. 1024 (1925).
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-MISSTATEMENTS HELD ACTIONABLE,-The defendant,
a common carrier, carelessly gave to the plaintiff wrong information con-
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cerning the storage place of goods consigned to the latter. The goods were
thereafter destroyed. As a result of the error being incorporated in the
insurance policy -which the plaintiff had procured on the goods, the policy
was avoided. In an action for negligence, the lower court gave judgment
for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affMrmed. Int'l
Products Co. v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 602 (19,7).
The instant case is further authority for the growing American doc-
trine of responsibility for negligent misstatements. New Hampshire and
New York have led the way. Edwards v. Lamb, 69 N. H. 599, 45 AtI. 480
(1899) ; Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922) ; (192G)
35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 767. Judicial support of the doctrine that, aside
from responsibility in fraud and deceit, "those engaged in supplying in-
formation are traditionally immune from liability in a suit by those not
in privity of contract" is thereby diminished. (1921) 31 Y=n LAw
JOURNAL, 218. It has been suggested that false information negligently
given by one in a position to know that the communicant will rely on it
and be damaged thereby should be actionable where loss is sustained by
reliance thereon. Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14
HARV. L. REV. 184. That proposition has been adopted almost verbatim
by the instant court.
W LLS-AGREEMENTS NOT TO CONTEST-PUBLIC POLICY NOT VOILATED.-A
testatrix decided to give money to her next of kin before her death instead
of by -will. In consideration therefor, the net of kin agreed not to con-
test her will, which left the estate to charity. The next of kin contested
probate. The appellate court certified for review the question whether the
agreements of the next of kin were against public policy. Held, that the
agreements were enforceable. In, re Cook's Will, 2.4 N. Y. 63, 154 N. E.
823 (1926).
Each of the several contracts in the instant case constitutes in effect a
conditional release of an expectancy, i. e., a release operative if the testator
makes a will not invalidated by a third party. In the analogous situation
of unconditional assignment or release many courts have held that the
contract is void at law. The first American cases so deciding generally
reached the result by reasoning mechanically that one can not transfer
what he does not have. Jackson v. Bradford, 4 Wend. 619 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1830); Dart v. Dart, 7 Conn. 250 (1828). Other cases have called such
agreements against public policy because of the opportunity afforded (1) to
force an unfair bargain, or (2) to perpetrate a fraud on the ancestor, or
(3) on the theory that they are wagering contracts. Boynton v. Hubbard,
7 Mass. 112 (1810) ; Baltimore Humane Soc. v. Pierce, 100 Md. 520, 60 AtI.
277 (1905); see McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 146, 147, 25 N. E. 179, 180,
181 (1890). In equity objection (3) is disregarded; objection (1) ob-
viated by insisting on adequate consideration; and objection (2) likewise,
in some jurisdictions, by insisting on the ancestor's knowledge of, or con-
sent to, the assignment. Richey v. Richey, 189 Iowa, 1300, 179 N. W. 830
(1920) (bill for partition); Farncrs' Loan & Trust Co. v. Wood, 78 Ind.
App. 147, 134 N. E. 899 (1922) (bill against trustee). When a party to
the contract is a testator, these objections should not apply. In the
parallel case of a testamentary gift conditioned to be void upon contest of
the will by the legatee, the condition is generally held in accord with pub-
lie policy. Estate of Kitchen, 192 Calif. 384, 220 Pac. 301 (1923); Moran
v. Moran, 144 Iowa, 451, 123 N. W. 202 (1909). Some courts allow con-
test if it be affirmatively shown to be bona fide. South Norwall Trust Co.
v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 AtI. 961 (1917); (1926) 39 Hanv. L. REV.
628; (1924) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 532. But there is no mention of such af-
firmative evidence in the instant case.
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